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ABSTRACT 
Following Bjorn and V uong (1984 ) , a model for dummy endogenous 
variables is derived from a game theoretic framework where the 
equilibrium concept used is that of Stackelberg . A distinctive 
feature of our model is that it contains as a special case the usual 
recursive model for discrete endogenous variables (see e . g., Maddala 
and Lee (1976 ) ) .  A structural interpretation of this latter model can 
then be given in terms of a Stackelberg game in which the leader is 
indifferent to the follower's action . Finally, the model is applied 
to a study of husband/wife labor force participation . 
ECONOMETRIC MODELING OF A STACKELBERG GAME WITH AN 
APPLICATION TO LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
Paul A. Bjorn and Quang H .  Vuong• 
California Institute of Technology 
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
Over the last few decades, economists have become increasingly 
interested in the modeling of choice over a finite number of 
alternatives (see, e . g . ,  Manski and McFadden (1981) , Maddala (1983 ) ) .
Although the first models were essentially single equation in nature, 
the literature on discrete variable models has rapidly evolved into 
simultaneous modeling (see e . g . ,  Amemiya (1978) and Heckman (1978) ) .  
In an earlier paper (Bjorn and Vuong (1984) ) ,  we proposed an 
alternative simultaneous model for discrete endogenous variables. A 
distinctive feature of our model is that no logical consistency 
constraints on the parameters need to be imposed, In addition, our 
si multaneous model was derived from optimizing behavior as an outcome 
of a game between two players . The equilibrium concept used wae that 
of Nash . 
Following this game theoretic formulation, we shall still 
assume that each player maximizes his own utility . The model proposed 
in the present paper is, however, different from our earlier 
simultaneous model since the equilibrium concept used here will be 
that of Stackelberg. Though it may appear that the model is 
recursive, it will be seen that the model in fact generalizes 
recursive models for discrete endogenous variables that have been 
considered up to now in the literature (see, e . g . ,  Maddala and Lee 
(1976 ) ) .  As before, our model becomes stochastic by adopt ing the 
rando� utility framework introduced by McFadden (1974 , 1981 ) .  
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As an empirical application, we shall study the joint decision 
of a husband and wife whether or not to participate in the labor 
force . The statistical model is derived by assuming the husband is 
the Stackelberg leader and his wife the follower . That is, we assume 
the husband knows what action his wife will take conditional upon his 
action and he thus optimizes accordingly . 
The paper is organized as follows . In Section 2, we derive 
the statistical model where the outcomes are generated as Stackelberg 
equilibria of a game played between two players .  Sec tion 3 compares 
the usual formulation of the problem in terms of recursive models with 
our alternative formulation . In particular , it is shown that the 
usual recursive model is nested in our more general model . In Section 
4, we discuss identification and estimation of our model . In Section 
5, the empirical example of husband/wife labor force participation is 
presented . Section 6 concludes the paper . Proofs of all propositions 
are presented in the Appendix and the construction of the data can be 
found in Bjorn and Vuong (1984) . 
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2. THE MODEL 
For ease of exposition, assume that the husband is the 
Stackel berg leader and the wife is the follower. Let Uh(i,j) be the 
payoff to the husband when he takes action i and his wife takes action 
j ,  i , j  e [0, 1} . Analogously, let U (j, i) be the payoff to the wife . w 
Then we have the extensive form: 
iiwc1,1) UW(O,l) iiw(l,O) iiwco,o) 
iiH(l,l) UH(l,O) UH(O,l) UH(O,O) 
Figure 1 
The husband, in making his decision whether to take ac tion 1 
or 0 must take the wife's payoffs into account. That is, the husband 
must take action i such that when the wife takes action j, conditional 
on i, Uh (i, j) gives the husband the greatest possible payoff .  There 
are four possible cases, W1, w2 , w3, and w4 for the husband to 
consider before taking his action i: 1 
w1 : ii < 1. 0> 2 ii co.o> i ii < 1. 1> 2 ii co.1>w w w w 
w2 : ii o.o> < ii < o. o> iii c1.1> 2 ii < o. ow w w w 
w3 : ii o.o> < ii < o.o> e ii < 1. 1> < ii < 0. 1> w w w w 
w4 ii (1, 0) 2 ii (0,0) t ii (1,1)w w w Uw (0,1)
The four cases w1, w2, w3• and w4 are the wife's reaction 
functions as given in Figure 2 .  For example, reaction func tion w1 
says that whether the husband chooses action 1 or 0, the wife always 
chooses action 1 .  Conditional on the reaction function 
WIFE 1 Wl 1 I 
w4 w2 
v w3 
0 1 
HUSBAND 
Figure 2: Wife's Reaction Functions 
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chosen by the wife, the husband then takes that action which maximizes 
his payoff .  For example, if the wife follows reaction function w1, 
the husband will choose action 1 when Uh(l, 1) 2 
U
h(0, 1), whil e 
choosing action 0 when the inequality is reversed. Thus, each 
reaction function Wi for the wife cal ls for a payoff comparison Ci for 
the husband . Therefore we define : 
c1 : uhc1.1> 2 uhco,1> 
c2 : uhc1.1> 2 uhco.o> 
c3 : uhc1.o> 2 uh<o.o> 
c4 : uhc1.oi 2 uhco,1> 
Let Ci indicate the negation of Ci . 
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Now that the reaction functions for the wife Wi and the payoff 
comparisons for the husband Ci have been defined, we can readily find 
the Stackelberg outcomes of this game, as indicated in Table 1 .
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Note 
that for each outcome, the first number in each ordered pair refers to 
the husband whil e the second number refers to the wife. 
Table 1: Stackelberg Equilibria 
w1 d Cl 
w1 d Cl 
w2 d C2 
w2 d c2 
( 1,1) 
( 0,1) 
( 1,1) 
( 0,0) 
W3 d c3 
W3 d C3 
w4 d c4 
W4 d c4 
( l,O) 
( 0,0) 
( 1. 0 )  
( 0,1) 
To introduce a stochastic structure, we shall follow McFadden 
( 197 4, 1981). The utilities tlh ( i ,j) and 
U
w ( j ,i) are then treated as 
random, and decomposed into deterministic components and random 
components . Further, we shall allow for the possibility that the 
utility the husband receives depends on the wife ' s  decision whether or 
not to work. We make a similar al lowance for the wife. Then formally 
we have the following set of four equations: 3 
where 
u 1 1 1 h ( l ,Ywl = Uh + ahYw + �h 
tJ 0 0 0 h( O,Yw) = Uh 
+ ahY w + �h 
u 1 1 1 w ( l,Yh) = Uw + awYh + �w 
u 0 0 0 w ( O, Yh) = Uw + awYh + �w 
1 if the husband works 
yh = i 0 otherwise 
Yw = { � if the wife works otherwise 
To illustrate, the utility that the husband receives from 
working when his wife also works ( Yw = 1) is given by 
O
h ( l ,l ) = U� + a� + ��· As can be seen from the wife ' s  reaction 
functions Wi and the husband ' s  utility ( payoff) comparisons 
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(1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
Ci' i = 1,2,3 ,4 , only differences in utilities are relevant in the 
husband ' s  and wife ' s  respective decisions whether or not to wor k .  As 
1 0 1 0 d a result, we define eh • �h - �h and ew • �w - �w· It is assume 
thereafter that the pair ( eh,aw) is normally distributed with zero 
means, unit variances and correlation p. 
The distribution of the random components ( eh,ew) then induces 
a probabilistic structure on the observed decisions ( Yh,Yw).  Indeed, 
each reaction function Wi for the wife will occur if some conditions 
on the random component ew are satisfied. For instance, reaction 
function W1 arises if and only if u
1 - u0 + e 2 o and w w w 
U1 - UO + a1 - aO + e 2 0 .  Once a reaction function for the wife is w w w w w 
determined, a utility comparison for the husband is also determined; 
that is, if the wife's reaction function is given by Wi, the husband 
makes utility comparison Ci' i = 1, • • • • 4 .  As with the wife, each 
utility comparison Ci will occur if a certain condition on the random 
component Eh is satisfied . 
1 0 1 0 Uh - Uh + ah - ah + Eh 2 0 .  
For instance c1 holds if and only if 
As shown in the Appendix, the conditions 
that must be satisfied by Ew and Eh are given by the following two 
tables . 
w1 : 
Table 2: Conditions for Wife's Reaction Functions 
EW ) -(U! - Ue) - min (O,a! - ae) 
W2 . - (U
l - uO + al - aO) < E < - (Ul - U
O) if al - aO } 0 . w w w w w w w w w 
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otherwise cannot occur 
w3 : s < -cu
1 - u0> - max (O,a1 - a0) w w w w w 
W4 · - (u
1 - UO) < s < - (U1 - U
O + a1 - aO) if a1 - aO ( O ; . w w w w w w w w w 
Table 3: 
otherwise cannot occur 
Conditions for Husband's Utility Comparisons 
1 0 1 0 Cl : Eh 2 -(Uh - Uh + ah - ah) 
1 0 1 C2 : eh 2 - (Uh - Uh + ah) 
1 _ uO) C3 : Eh 2 - (Uh h 
1 0 0 c4 : Eh 2 -< uh - uh - ah) 
Now that randomness has been introduced into the model, we can 
derive the joint probabilities on the part of both the husband and 
wife whether or not to work. Let Pr(i,j) be the probability that the 
random variables Yh and Y w take on the values i and j, i,j s {0,1}. 
From Table 1, we have 
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Pr(0,0) = Pr (W2 d c2) + Pr(W3 d C3) (S) 
Pr(l,0) = Pr(W3 d c3) + Pr(W4 d C4l (6)  
Pr (O,l) = Pr (W1 & c1> + Pr(W4 d 
c4> ( 7) 
Pr(l,l) = Pr(W1 d C1) + Pr(W2 d C2l (8) 
Using Tables 2 and 3 and Equations (S) - (8) we can derive the 
probabil i ties in terms of the unknown parameters. Let F(a,b,p) be the 
c. d . f .  evaluated at (a,b) of a bivariate normal distribution with zero 
means, unit variances, and correlation p . Moreover , let I (a,b.c,d,p) 
be the integral corresponding to a bivariate density over the range 
a i sh 2 c, b 2 sw 2 d .
4 As can be seen from Table 2, the 
probabil i tes Pr (i,j) will depend on the sign of Aa • (a._1 - a0) .  We w w w 
then have: 
PROPOSITION 1 :  
B Pr(0,0) = F (-AUh,-AUw,p) - I+ 
F(-AUh,-AUw,p) 
Pr(l,0) = F (AUh,-AUw - Aaw,-p) 
B F (AUh,-AUw - Aaw,-p) + I_ 
Pr(O,l) = F (-AUh - a� + ag. Auw,-p) 
1 0 A F (-AUh - ah + ah,AUw,-p) + I_ 
if Aa w 2 0 ( 9 )  
otherwise 
if Aaw 2 0 (10) 
otherwise 
if Aaw 2 0 (11) 
otherwise 
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Pr(l ,1) F (AUh + 
F (AUh + 
1 0 ah - ah,AUw + Aaw,p) I
A 
+ if Aaw 2. 0 (12 ) 
where 
1 0 ah - ah,AUw + Aaw,p) otherwise 
A 1 1 0 I+ = I (-AUh - ah,-AUw,-AUh - ah + ah,-AUw - Aaw,p) 
B 1 u I+ = I(-AUh,-AUw,-AUh - ah,-A w - Aaw,p) 
A O 1 O_U I_ = I (-AUh + ah,-AUw - Aaw,-AUh - ah + ah
' A w•P) 
B 0 I_ = I (-AUh,-AUw - Aaw,-AUh + ah,-AUw,p) 
1 0 1 0 AUh 
� uh - uh and AUw e uw - uw. 
It is of interest to know the direction of change in the 
(13) 
probabilities that the husband Pr (l,•) and the wife Pr(•,l) will work 
as the parameters vary . We then have : 
PROPOSITION 2: 
(1) An increase in a� or AUh always increases the probability that 
the husband will work, Pr(l,•) ; 
(ii) an increase in a� always decreases the probability that the 
husband will work ; 
(i ii ) an increase in Aaw or AUw always increase the probability that 
the wife will work, Pr(·,1 ) . 
As expected, an increase in AUh increases the probability that 
the husband will work, whether or not the wife chooses to work; a 
similar remark holds for an increase in AUw· Also, as can be seen 
from equation (1) ,  an increase in a� increases the probability that 
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the husband will work when he knows his wife wishes to work, while 
having no effect on his propensity to work when he knows his wife 
chooses not to work . From equation (2 ) ,  it is clear that an increase 
in a� increases the husband's utility of not working .  Finally using 
equations (3) and (4) , it is seen that an increase in AUw increases 
the wife' s utility of joining the labor market . (Included with the 
proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix is a table indicating the 
direction on change in the probabilities Pr(i,j) as all parameters are 
allowed to vary ) . 
3 . A COMPARISON OF MODELS 
Now that we have developed a model in which the outcomes of 
the sequential decision-making problem are generated as Stackelberg 
equilibria of a game between two players, we are in a position to 
compare it to the usual recursive probability model for dichotomous 
variables (see e . g . ,  Maddala and Lee (1976) ) .  According to the usual 
formulation, a recursive equation system is described in terms of 
latent continuous variables, where the observed dicho tomous variables 
are generated using a dichotomization . In our case, the corresponding 
recursive probability model is 
• 
yw = Aw + Pw
Y
h + 8w (14 ) 
• 
yh = Ah + 8h (15 ) 
for some Ah and Aw' and 
• • 
1 if yh > o. 
yw = { : if Yw > O, yh = l 0 otherwise, otherwise . 
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The purpose of this section is to show that this recursive probability 
model is nested in our model of Section 2. 
al h 
Suppose that 
0 ah = O; (16) 
then from equations (1) and (2) defining the husband's utilities, we 
have: 
O
h (l ,Yw> 
U
h co,Yw> 
u1 + 11
1 
h h 
0 0 uh + 11h 
Thus the restrictions (16) can be interpreted as imposing that the 
utilities derived by the husband from working or not working do not 
depend on the wife's decision whether or not to work. 
But now note that if the restrictions (16) hold, then from 
Table 3 ,  the four conditions c1, c2, c3, and c4 are identical; that 
is, eh 2 -AUh . Looking now at the conditions for the wife's reaction 
functions, we have to distinguish two cases according to the sign of 
Aaw . Suppose first that Aaw 20. Then it is readily seen from Tables 1 
and 2 that the pairs (1,1), (1,0), (0,1), and (0,0) occur under the 
followi ng conditions: 
(1,1) if and only if AUh + eh 2 o and AUw + Aaw + ew 2 0, 
(1,0) if and only if AUh + eh 2 0 and AUw + Aaw + ew < 0, 
(0,1) if and only if AUh + eh < 0 and AUw + ew L 0, 
(0,0) if and only if AUh + eh < 0 and AUw + ew < O. 
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It suffices now to note that these conditions are exactly identical to 
the ones that are obtained from the recursive probability model (14)-
(15) with the usual dichotomization where Ah = AUh and Aw = AUw . The 
case Aaw < 0 is similarly studied, and gives the same conditions as 
above on the errors eh and ew . We have therefore established the 
following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3 :  If the restrictions a� = ag = 0 hold, then the usual 
recursive probability model using the dichotomization rule is 
identical to our model in which the observed outcomes are generated as 
Stackelberg equilibria . 
The import of Proposition 3 is that it gives a structural 
interpretation to the usual recursive probability model in terms of a 
Stackelberg game . In addition , since the restrictions (16) on the 
parameters of our model must hold in order for the result in 
Proposition 3 to hold, it follows that the usual recursive probability 
model i s  nested in our proposed model.  As an empirical consequence, 
it is then possible to test the specification of the usual recursive 
model by testing a� = ag = O. Finally, given the above interpretation 
of these restrictions, it can be seen that these restrictions are 
unrealistic since they impose that the utilities of the husband (from 
working or not working) do not depend on whether the wife is working . 
Thus the usual recursive formulation is inappropriate since it 
implicitly assumes that the leader is indifferent to the follower's 
action. Let us also note that although the husband is moving first 
and in principle should take into account his wife's condi tional 
action when making his decision, the restrictions (16) when imposed 
lead the husband to ignore his wife's action. 
4. IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION 
Given the previous expressions for the probabilities Pr(i,j) 
of the observed dichotomous variables Y h and Y w• the log-likeli hood 
function under random sampling is written as : 
13 
L � log Prt (Yht' ywt> (17) 
� [Y htyw t  log Prt (l,l) + Yht (l - Ywt> log Prt (l,0) 
+ (1 - Y ht>Y wt log Prt (0,1) + (1 - Yht) (l - Ywt> log Prt (0,0)] 
where the subscript t indexes the observations . The probabilities are 
subscripted by t since AUh and AUw are in general functions of 
explanatory variables . We assume : 
AU ht xhtYh and AUwt = xwtYw· (18) 
where xht may include characteristics of the t-th household and 
characteristics of the husband . A similar remark applies to xwt· We 
now turn to the conditions under which the parameters 
( 0 1 p,Aaw,ah,ah,yh,yw) of our model are identi fied . 
In order to discuss identification, we first need to introduce 
some notation. Define the following partitioned matrix I as 
I [D X p p DhXh DX l w w 
14 
where D 
P , Dh and Dw are block diagonal matrices of order
 3T, the t-th 
blocks given as follows: 
if Aa w 2 o 
l+ rt 
Dpt = 1 0 
0 
if Aaw < 0 
D 
1-rt 
pt = IO 
0 
0 
2 + rt 
0 
0 
2 -r t 
3-r t 
0 
3+ ' Dht 
= 
rt 
4+ rt 
0 
0 1 · Dht 
4-r t 
0 0 
0 (b�++c�+) 
-dh+ t 0 
[_
( 
h
: 
,dh-) L ct t 
0 
h­b t 
0 
h+ at 
0 
0 
h­at 
0 
0 
' Dwt = 
Dwt 
0 
bw+ t 
dw+ t 
W­at 
0 
w­c t 
0 
w+ ct 
0 
0 
bw­t 
0 
The elements of the above matrices are described in part (e) of the 
Appendix . The matrices Xh and Xw are of dimension 3T by Kh + 2 and 
3T 
by Kw + 1, the t-th blocks given respectively as: 
r - 1  0 xht { I o xwt 
l : 
1 xht I and I 1 xwt 
0 xht j L 1 xwt 
In addition, X is a unit vector of dimension 3T .  p 
PROPOSITION 4 :  1 0 The parameters (p,Aaw,ah,ah,yh,yw) of the model are 
identified if and only if I has full column rank. 
w+ at 
0 
0 
0 
0 
d�J 
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As seen in part (e) of the Appendix, the elements of the 
matrices D
P
, Dh' and Dw are all nonzero. Moreover, these matrices are 
nonsingular in both cases since they are either triangular matrices or 
can be made triangular by suitable permutations of rows and columns. 
By examining matrix l above, it is clear that if l does not have full 
column rank, it will occur only extremely rarely for some specific 
values of the parameters as an artifact of certain explanatory 
variables. We have, although, the following necessary condition for 
iden ti fica ti on. 
COROLLARY 1: 1 0 If Aaw • aw - aw 0, the model is not identified. 
As a practical implication of the corollary for estimation, it 
must be the case that the initial values chosen for a1 and a0 not be w w 
the same. Otherwise, the information matrix will be nonsingular at 
the first iteration, and the optimization cannot be carried out. We 
now turn to estimation. 
The estimation routine we employ is a version of the iterative 
procedure suggested by Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974), where 
1 0 we provide various initial values for (Aaw,ah,ah,yh,yw) with a grid 
search over possible values of p and iterate until convergence. 
5 .  AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE 
A. THE MODEL 
The following four equations will be used to describe the 
joint behavior of a representative married couple: 
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wr _ •- o o 
h - Zhyh + ahYw + �h (19) 
r •- 0 0 Ww : Zwyw + awYh + �w 
m _ ' 1 1 Wh - Xhyh + ahYw + �h 
m ' 1 1 Ww : Xwyw + awYh + �w 
Equations (19) and (20) describe the reservation wages, or 
equivalently, the shadow price of time for the husband and wife, 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
respectively. Note that the wife ' s  decision whether or not to work, 
given by the dichotomous variable Yw• affects the husband ' s  
reservation wage in (19). Analogously, the husband's decision whether 
or not to work, given by Yh, af fects the wife's reservation wage in 
(20). Equations (21) and (22) describe the market wages for the 
husband and the wife, respectively. Note that we allow the 
possibility that one of the determinants of the husband ' s  market wage 
is whether or not he has a working wife; we make a similar allowance 
for the wife. 
Moreover, let the husband's (wife ' s) reservation wage play the 
role of the payoff he (she) derives from not working. Therefore we 
r _ R r have Wh - uh(O,Yw) and WW !1w(O,Yh). Similarly, let the husband ' s  
(wife ' s) market wage play the role of the payoff he (she) derives from 
working. We thus have W� : Uh(l,Y ) and Wm : U (l,Yh). •• .. w w w . 
From equations (1) through (4) we see that AUh : X�Yh - ZhYh 
. 
and AUw : Xwyw - ZwYw· Moreover, note that in specifying the 
husband ' s  reservation wage and market wage equations, given by (19) 
and (21) respectively, it may be the case that certain explanatory 
17 
variables appear in both equations, implying that the associated 
coefficient in AUh will be measuring the difference between the market 
and reservation wage coefficients. A similar remark holds for the 
wife. In addition, note that the assumptions on error terms are also 
1 0 1 0 satisfied, namely eh • �h - �h and ew = �w - �w· 
We must now specify the set of explanatory variables for the 
market wage equations and the reservation wage equations for the 
husband and wife. Market wages for the husband and wife are specified 
in (23 )  and (2 4) respectively. Reservation wages for the husband and 
wife are specified in (25) and (2 6) respectively.5 
iJh(l,Yw) 
U (1,Yh) w 
Uh(O,Yw) 
Uw(O,Yh) 
• .DJ 0 1 2 3 4 1 1 wh = yh + 'Yb AGEH + 'Yb EDUCH + 'Yb UNEM + 'Yb RACE + ahYw + �h 
w: 
wr h 
wr w 
(+) (+) (-) (-) 
yo + l AGEW + w 'Yw 
(+) 
+ y
4 UNEM + w 
(- ) 
y2 AGEW**2 + y3 EDUCW w w 
(-) (+) 
5 1 1 'Yw RACE + awYh + �w 
(-) 
(23) 
(2 4) 
- 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 yh + yh AGEH + yh EDUCH + yh UNEM + yh RACE + yh ASSETS 
(+) (+) (-) (-) 
-6 -7 0 0 + yh KIDS<13 + yh KIDS>14 + ahYw + �h 
(7) (7) 
y O + y 1AGEW + y 2 AGEW**2 + y 3EDUCW + y 4UNEM w w w w w 
(-) (-) (+) (-) 
( +) 
+ y 5RACE + y 6ASSETS + y 7KIDS1-2 + y 8KIDS3 - 5  w w w w 
(-) (+) (+) (+) 
+ y 9KIDS6-13 + y lOKIDS>14 + aOYh + �O w w w w 
( +) (?) 
(2 5) 
(26) 
where 
AGEH Age of husband 
AGEW Age of wife 
AGEW••2 Squared age of wife 
EDUCH Number of years of formal schooling of husband 
EDUCW Number of years of formal schooling of wife 
UNEM Local unemployment rate 
RACE 1 = Black or Hispanic, 0 otherwise 
ASSETS Family ' s  annual income other than from wages or salaries 
KIDSl-2 Number of children in family unit ages 1 and 2. 
KIDS3 -5 Number of children between ages 3 and S • 
KIDS6-13 Number of children between 6 and 13. 
KIDS<13 Number of children 13 years or younger 
KIDS)14 Number of children 14 years or older 
18 
The plus and minus signs under the explanatory variables in Equations 
(23)-(26) indicate the expected impact of each variable in the 
respective equation. From equations (23) through (26), we have the 
following expressions for AUh and AUw 
0 -o 1 -1 2 -2 3 -3 AUh = (yh - yh ) + (yh - yh )AGEH + (yh - yh )EDUCH + (yh - yh )UNEM 
and 
AU w 
+ (y� - yh4lRACE - yh5ASSETS - yh6KIDS13 - yh
7KIDS14 
ll ll ii •• •• 
( 27) 
(yo - y O) + (y1 - y 1)AGEW + (y2 - y 2JAGEW**2 + (y3 - y 3lEDUCW w w w w w w w w 
4 -4 5 -s -6 -7 + (yh - yh )UNEM + (y - y )RACE - y ASSETS - y KIDSl-2 w w w w 
19 
- y 8KIDS3 -5 - y 9KIDS6-13 y l OKIDS > l4 ( 28 )  w w w 
The data we will use in this study on married couples is from 
the 1982 wave of the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's 
Panel Study on Income Dynamics, 196 8-1982 . The data is restricted to 
2 012 records for married couples living in the U . S . ,  where both the 
husband and the wife were able-bodied, neither older than 64 years of 
age with no nonrelative living with the family ( se e  Bjorn and Vuong 
( 1984)) .  
B .  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
From equations ( 19 )  and ( 21) it will be recal led that not only 
does the model allow for the possibility that one of the de terminants 
of the husband's reservation wage is whether or not his wife chooses 
to work, the model also al lows for the possibil ity that the husband's 
market wage is affected by his wife's decision. Although economic 
theory suggests that only the former effect should be meaningful, we 
can test that hypothesis in our model by allowing for the presence of 
both effects; that is, both ag and � are include d .  The maximum 
likel ihood estimates of the parameters of the full model are presented 
in Table 4. 
From the t-statistic associated with a� , it follows that 
a� = O cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance, as 
theory suggests. Although we see from Table 4 that most of the 
explanatory variables, especially for the wife, have the a priori 
correct sign and are highly significant, we therefore reestimate the 
model without a� . These latter results are presented in Table 5 .  
The value of p that maximizes the log-likel ihood function is 
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- . 4 5 .  Although it may at first appear surprising that this maximizing 
value of p is not positive, it must be remembered that p is not simply 
the correlation between omitted variables in the husband's and wife's 
equations, but arises from a more complicated relationship between the 
1 0 1 0 disturbance terms eh and ew• viz, eh • �h - �h and ew • �w - �w as 
seen in Section 2 . From the table we see that both Aaw and ag are 
significantly different from zero, providing evidence that the wife's 
decision whether or not to work depends on the husband's decision and 
vice versa . Although it wil l be recal led from Section 4 that only the 
difference Aa • a1 -w w 
theory again suggests 
a0 can be identified in our model, economic w 
that a1 should be a priori zero. Therefore the w 
estimate -1 . 12 of Aa is actually an estimate of -a0• w w With this in 
mind then, we see from equation ( 20) that if the husband works, the 
wife's reservation wage increases as expected since � is positive . w 
It should also be noticed from Table 5 that we can provide a 
test of Proposition 3 .  Since a� is restricted to be a priori zero and 
ag is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, we can 
reject the hypothesis that the data are generated by the usual 
recursive probabil ity model using a dichotomization rul e .  In other 
words, we must accept the hypothesis that the husband takes his wife's 
conditional action into account when making his decision whether or 
not to work. 
CONSTANT 
AGEH 
AGEW 
AGEW ••2 
EDU CH 
EDU CW 
UNEM 
RACE 
ASSET 
KIDSl-2 
KIDS3-5 
KIDS6-13 
KIDS < 13 
KIDS > 14 
Coefficient 
ao h 
al h 
0 -o 
(yh - yh) 
(y� - y�) 
2 -i 
(yh - yh) 
3 -3 
(yh - yh) 
4 -4 
(yh - yh) 
-:Y5 h 
-6 -yh 
-Y' h 
Hu sband 
Estimate 
-1.98 
-0.256 
-0.736 
0.014 
0 .071 
-0.040 
-0.330 
0.410 
0.021 
0.104 
log-likelihood value = -1514.93 
• significant at the 1°" level 
•• significant at the 5� level 
TABLE 4 
p = .40 
t-
Statistic 
-1. 72• 
-0.30 
-0.60 
1. 75• 
1.81• 
-1.98** 
-2.55•• 
1.35 
0.29 
0.93 
Coefficient 
b.a w 
1
o _ -o, 
W 1w 
(y
l - :y1, w w 
(y
2 - :y2, w w 
(y
3 - y3) w w 
<1! - :Y!> 
<1! - :Y!> 
-:Y6 w 
-Y' w 
-8 -yw 
-9 -yw 
_:yto 
w 
Wife 
t-
Estimate Statistic 
-1.ts -2.02 .. 
0.330 0.43 
0.084 3.48•• 
-0 .131 -4.32•• 
0.039 3 .21•• 
-0.014 -1.48 
0.420 5.66•• 
-0.012 -2 .13•• 
-0.685 -11.10•• 
-0.444 -7.30** 
-0.212 -5.66** 
-0.132 -2.10•• 
CONSTANT 
AGEH 
AGEW 
AGEW**2 
EDU CH 
EDU CW 
UNEM 
RACE 
ASSET 
KIDSl-2 
KIDS3-S 
KIDS6-13 
KIDS < 13 
KIDS > 14 
Coefficient 
0 
a h  
0 -o 
(yh - yh) 
1 -1 
(yh - yh) 
2 -2 
(yh - yh) 
3 -3 
(yh - yh) 
4 -4 
(yh - yh) 
-s -yh 
-6 -yh 
-1 -yh 
Husband 
Estimate 
-1.82 
-o. 784 
0.013 
0.069 
-0.038 
-0.33S 
0.400 
0.034 
0.109 
log-likelihood value = -151 4.99 
• significant at the l<>" level 
•• significant at the S� level 
TABLE S 
p = .4S 
t-
Statistic 
-2.u•• 
-0.63 
1.68• 
1. 79• 
-1.97 .. 
-2.64•• 
1.36 
0.63 
0.99 
Coefficient 
4aw 
0 -o 
(yw - 1w) 
1 -1 
(yw - 1w) 
2 -2 
(yw - 1w) 
3 -3 
(yw - 1w) 
4 -4 
(yw - 1w) 
s -s 
(yw - 1w) 
-11 -yw 
-1 -yw 
-11 -yw 
-9 -yw 
-10 -yw 
Wife 
t-
Estimate Statistic 
-1.12 -1.92• 
0.31 0.40 
0.083 3.47 •• 
-o .130 -4.31*• 
0.040 3 .34•• 
-0.014 -1.SO 
0.442 S.69 .. 
-0.012 -2 .13•• 
-0.684 -u .20•• 
-0.447 -1.4S .. 
-o .214 -s. ss•• 
-0.132 -2. 10•. 
A priori, we would expect the estimate of ag to be positive; 
that is, we expect that the wife's decision to work should lower the 
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husband's reservation wage. In contrast , we find that the estimate of 
a� is negative and significant at the S percent level. One possible 
explanation for this result is that no husband wishes to bear the 
embarrassment of staying at home when his wife chooses to work; that 
is , the husband chooses to lower his reservation wage when his wife is 
working . 
Looking again at Table S, we see that most of the coefficients 
explaining the wife's decision whether or not to work are in agreement 
with our expectations and are highly significant . ( In reading Table 
5 ,  it should be noted that all estimated coefficients represent either 
differences between market and reservation wages or minus the 
reservation wage coefficient, as seen in Equations ( 27) and ( 28 ) . )  
For example , family income from sources other than wages and salaries 
( ASSET ) has the expected effect of increasing the wage at which the 
_6 
wife is willing to accept work outside the home ( yw = +0.012 ) .  
Concerning children, one would certainly expect that mothers would be 
least likely to leave the home when children are very young and be 
more inclined to seek outside employment as children become older and 
more self-sufficient . That is, younger children should have the 
effect of increasing the mother's reservation wage more than do older 
children . Indeed , this is what we see from Table S .  Children between 
the ages of one and two ( KIDSl -2)  raise the mother's reservation wage 
more than do children between three and five ( KIDS3-5 ) ; her 
22 
reservation wage is higher for children between three and five than 
for children six to thirteen ( KIDS6-13 ) ;  finally , the mother is more 
likely to stay at home when her children are between six and thirteen 
than when they are fourteen years or older ( KIDS>14 ) .  The coefficient 
on the wives' education ( EDUCW) is also consistent with our priori 
expectation; although an increase in education should increase the 
wife's market wage, it should also increase her reservation wage. The 
estimated positive coefficient on the female race dummy ( RACE) seems 
to suggest that women of racial minorities, on average, can com mand a 
higher market wage than the wage necessary to entice them into the 
labor market ; that is, minority women are on average worth more in the 
marketplace than they think they are worth. Turning finally to the 
effect of age on a wife's decision whether or not to work, a life-
cycle model of employment would suggest that women are more likely to 
work during middle age than either early or late in their life times . 
That is, the probability that our individual will work exhibits a 
concave shape. As can be seen from Table 5, the combined effects of a 
positive linear term on age ( AGEW) and a negative quadratic term 
( AGE••2) does indeed impart an increasing then a decreasing shape with 
respect to age with a peak at about 32 years of age. 
Turning next to the variables used to explain the husband's 
decision whether or not to work, we see that while some of the 
coefficients are insignificant, many of the variables to which we 
attached strong priors are indeed signi ficant. For example, the 
coefficients attached to the husband's age (AGEH) , his education 
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(EDUCH) and the local unemployment rate (UNEM) are each significant . 
Since each of these three coefficients measure the difference between 
the husband's market wage and his reservation wage, it is not 
surprising that they all should be close to z ero if the husband is 
behaving rationally; for example, the effect of an increase in 
education should not only increase an individual's market wage but 
should also increase his reservation wage . Finally, we see that the 
effects of racial discrimination on minorities has the effect of 
lowering their market wages relative to those of nonminorities. 
6 .  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented an alternative approach for 
formulating simultaneous equations models for qualitative endogenous 
variables which integrates results in game theory and discrete choice 
modeling . In this game theoretic formulation, we assume the two 
individuals play a S tackelberg game in which each player maximizes his 
own utility ; the model was made stochastic by adopting the random 
utility framewor k .  
A distinctive feature o f  our model is that i t  general izes the 
recursive models for discrete endogenous variables that have been 
proposed up to now in the literature; that is, the usual recursive 
model is nested in our game theoretic model . Although recursive 
models have been used in the formulation of many econometric problems 
in which sequential decision making is a distinct feature, these 
models implicitly assume that the leader is indifferent from the 
2 4 
follower's action. If this is not the case, then the usual recursive 
models are misspecified since they ignore the optimizing behavior of 
the leader who is taking into account the conditional action of the 
second agent when choosing his action . As such, the usual recursive 
model of a sequential decision making problem is inadequate in many 
problems. In contrast, our formulation in terms of a Stackelberg 
model' allows for optimizing behavior on the part of both agents . 
As an empirical application, we studied the joint decision of 
a husband and wife whether or not to participa te in the labor market. 
Here it was assumed that the husband was the Stackelberg leader and 
his wife was the follower where both were fully optimizing; that is, 
we assumed that the husband knew what action his wife would take and 
he thus optimized accordingly . Since the usual recursive model is 
nested in our model, we were able to reject the recursive 
specification for the problem we studied; that is, we were able to 
reject the hypothesis that the husband did not take his wife's 
conditional action into account when making his decision whether or 
not to wor k .  In addition, most o f  the coefficients for which w e  held 
strong priors had the correct signs and significant t-statistics. 
APPENDIX 
a. Conditions for Wife's Reaction Functions 
Using Figure 2, reaction function w1 is characterized by the 
following two conditions: U ( 1,0) 2. U ( 0,0) and U ( 1,1) l U ( 0,1) . w w w w 
Using ( 3) and ( 4) from the text, these conditions are equivalent to 
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e > -< u1 - u0> and w - w w s > -cu
1 
-w - w u
0 + a1 - a0), respectively, w w w which can 
be combined to give e 2. -cu1 -w w u0> - min ( O, a
1 - a0) .  w w w 
Reaction function w2 is characterized by 
U ( 1,0) < U ( 0,0) and w w 
u ( 1,1) 2. u ( 0,1), which are equivalent to e � -cu1 - u0 i and w w . w w w 
e > -cu1 - u0 + a1 - a0), respectively . When combined, they give the w w w w w 
result in the text . 
Reaction function w3 is characterized by 
U ( 1,0) < U ( 0,0) and w w 
U ( 1,1) < U ( 0,1). Using ( 3) and ( 4) from the text, these conditions w w 
. 1 0 l 0 1 0 are equivalent to ew < - ( Uw - Uw) and ew < - ( Uw - Uw + aw - aw), 
respectively . When combined, we get the result in the tex t .  
Reaction function w4 i s  characterized by U ( 1,0) 2. U ( 0,0) and w w 
- - 1 0 Uw ( l,l) < Uw ( O,l), which are equivalent to ew 2. - ( Uw - Uw) and 
e < -cu1 - u0 + a1 - a0), respectively, which when combined give w w w w w 
-cu1 - u0 > < e < -cu1 - u0 + a1 - a0) if a1 - a0 < O; otherwise w4 w w w w w w w w w 
cannot occur . 
b .  Conditions for Husband's Utility Comparisons 
Using Figure 1 in the text, when the wife follows reaction 
function w
1
, the husband compares Uh( l,l) and 
U
h( O,l). 
- ( 1 uo Uh( O,l), then from ( 1) and ( 2) we have eh 2. - Uh - h 
rr uhc1.1> 1 
1 0 + ah - ah)• 
When the wife follows reaction function w2 , the husband 
compares Uh( l,l) and 
U
h( O,O) . When 
U
h( l,l) 2. 
U
h( 0,0), we have eh 2 
- ( U� - u� + a�) .  
When reaction function w3 is used, the husband compares 
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- - - - 1 Uh( l,l) and Uh( O,l) . When Uh( l,l) 2. Uh( O,l), we have eh 2. -( Uh 
0 Uh) .  
Finally, Figure 1 shows that when the wife uses w4, the 
husband makes a comparison between Uh( l,O) and 
U
h( O,l) . If 
- - 1 Uh ( l,0) l Uh( O,l), we have from ( 1) and ( 2) that eh 2. - ( Uh 
c .  PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: 
UO h 
0 ah) .  
From Table 2, i t  i s  clear that reaction function w4 for the 
wife cannot occur when ( a1 - a0) w w 
cannot occur when Ca1 - a0) < O. w w 
l 0, while reaction function w2 
Thus when Ca1 - aO) l 0 it follows w w 
from equations ( 5) - ( 8) that 
Pr( 0,0) = Pr(W2 t C2 ) + Pr ( W3 t C3), 
Pr( l,0) = Pr( W3 t C3 >, 
Pr ( O,l) + Pr ( W1 t c1), 
Pr ( l,l) = PrCW1 t C1) + PrCW2 t C2) .  
Similarly, when Ca1 - a0) < 0 ,  w e  have w w 
Pr ( 0,0) : Pr( W3 8 c3 ), 
Pr( l,0) = Pr( W3 t c3 > + Pr CW4 t c4>, 
Pr ( O,l) = PrCW1 t c1> + Pr ( W4 t c4 > .  
Pr< 1. ll = Pr< w1 t c1 > . 
t> t> b. I> c: 
<:
c: c: c: <: 
.:, .: t> R � .: 
� 
0 .o 
8 "'"' 
I 
i> [> c:: 
:r c:: 
b :r Q 
-t ,,,._, � :ro H :ro H +> l;t> ..., ..., ..... ..... I QQ i> QQ [> c c c:: '1 c: ... t "' :r "' Q N N :ro "' ::n--> O" H H +t= '"' 
I i> [> 
c:: c: :r :r 
Now, using the conditions on ew and eh given in Tables 2 and 
3, respectively , we can derive the needed comparisons between 
particular Wi' Ci' and Ci' i = 1 ,  • • •  ,4. For the cases 
Aa = (a1 - a0) 2 O and Aa = (a
1 - a0) < 0 ,  figures 2 a and 2b w w w w w w 
respectively show the areas over the bivariate normal density for 
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(eh , ew) which must be integrated to obtain the four probabilities 
Pr(0 , 0), Pr(l,0), Pr(0 , 1), and Pr(l, 1). Without loss of generality , 
figures 2 a and 2b are drawn for the case a� < 0 < a�. It can be seen 
from figures 2a and 2b that IA, IB, IA and IB correspond to the areas + + - -
over the bivariate normal density given by (13) in the text. It 
follows that the probabilities Pr(0 , 0) ,  Pr(l, 0 ) ,  Pr(O,l), and Pr(l , 1) 
are given by equations (9) - (13) in Proposition 1. 
d. First partial derivatives of the Probabilities Pr(i,j): Let � be 
the univariate normal c.d. f. and let 'I' be the corresponding p.d.f. We 
then use the relations aF(��y,p) = <p(x)�(y•
 
- px*> , aF(x.y.p) = 
<p(y)'IJ(x 
• - py
•
) ,  and aF(�'/'p) = f(x , y , p) where a quantity with a "*" 
means that quantity is divided by the square root of (1 - p
2). In 
addition , let f(x , y, p) be the p.d.f. corresponding to the bivariate 
normal c. d.f. F(x, y,p). Then from equations (9)-(13), the first 
partial derivatives of the probabilities Pr(i,j) use the following: 
aF(-AUh,-Auw_
' p) 
ilyh 
• • 
-<p(AUh)q>(-AUw + pAUh)xh' 
) . . i!F(-AUh,-AUw , p = -<p(AUW)'IJ(-AUh + pAUW)xw' ilyw 
ilF(-AUh,-AUW,p) 
aAa w 
0 ,  
3F(-A�h,-AUw,p� 
0 aah 
aF (-AUh. -A�w· p) 
1 aah 
o. 
0, 
3F(-AUh, -AUw,p) _ f(- • U -AU , p); - - - u h ' w ap 
arh 
- ) • • *> 3F(AUh,-AUw - Aaw� 
= <p(Ah)'IJ(-AUw - Aaw + pAUh xh' 
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) . . . 3F(AUh , -AUW - Aaw , -p = -<p(AUw + Aaw)'IJ(AUh - p(AUW + Aaw))xw' arw 
3F(AUh , -AUw - Aaw , -p) 
aAa w 
3F(AUh , -AUw - Aaw , -p) 
0 aah 
3F(AUh,-AUw - Aaw , -p) 
1 aah 
• • • 
-<p(AUw + Aaw)'IJ(AUh - p(AUW + Aaw)
), 
0 ,  
= 0 ,  
3F(AUh,-AUW - Aaw , -p) = -f(AUh , -AUw - Aaw , -p); ap 
1 0 AU -p) 1 0 3F(-AUh - ah + ah, w' = -<p(AUh + ah - ah) arh 
1 0 3F(-AUh - ah + ah , AUw,-p) 
ayw 
1 0 3F(-AUh - ah + ah ,AUW , -p) 
aAa w 
• • 1* o• X cfl(AUw - p(AUh + ah - ah ))xh' 
• 1* o• • = <p(AUw)cfl(-AUh - ah + ah + pAUw)xw' 
o. 
1 0 AU -p) ' 0 3F(-AUL - aL + ah' w' - <p(AU + ah - ah) u 
u 
h 0 aah 
• • 1* - aO*>>. X �(AU - p(AUh + ah h w 
1 0 AU -p) 1 0 3F(-AUh - ah + ah' w' = -<p(AUh + ah - ah) 1 aah 
• • l• o• X cf>(AUW - p(AUh + ah - ah )), 
1 0 AU -p) 1 0 ) . 
aF(-AUh - ah + __'.Ji..'.__!'1.'.._ __ = -f(-AUh - ah + ah,AUw,-p ' ap 
1 0 AU + Aa ,p) 1 0) 
aF(AUh + �JL_�w _ _ _ w __ = 'fCAUh + ah - ah 
-- -- ayh 
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• • • l• o• X cf>(AUw + Aaw - p(AUh + ah - ah ))xh' 
1 0 aF(AUh + ah - ah,AU + Aa ,p) w w 
= 'f(AU + Aa ) ayw w w 
• l• o• • • X ci>(AUh + ah - ah - p(AUw + Aaw))xw, 
1 0 AU + Aa ,p) aF(AUh + ah - ah' w w = 'f(AUw + Aaw) aAaw 
• l• o• • • 
X cl>CAUh + ah - ah - p(AUw + Aaw)), 
aF(.AUh + 1 0 ah - ah,AUw + Aaw,p) 1 0 = -'f(.AUh + ah - ah) 0 aah 
• • • l• o• X cl>(.AUw + .Aaw - p(.AUh + � - ah )), 
aF(AUh + 1 0 ah - ah,.AUw + .Aaw,p) 1 0 = 'f(AUh + ah - ah) 1 aah 
• • • l• o• X ci>(.AUw + Aaw - p(.AUh + ah - ah )), 
1 0 aF(.AUh + ah - ah,.AUw + A_aw,p) 1 0 f(AUh + ah - ah,.AUw + .Aaw,p); 
and 
__ A ".l+ 
ayh 
ap 
1 • • l• [-'f(.AUh + ah)cf>(-AUW + p(.AUh + ah )) 
1 • • • l• + 'f(.AUh + ah)cf>(-AUw - Aaw + p(.AUh + ah )) 
1 o • • l• o• + 'f(.AUh + ah - ah)cl>(-.AUw + p(.AUh + � - ah )) 
1 o • • • l• o• - 'f(.AUh + ah - ah)cl>(-AUw - .Aaw + p(.AUh + ah - ah ))]xh' 
A ar + 
ayw 
• l• • [-'f(AUw)<p(-AUh - ah + pAUw) 
• l• • • 
+ 'f(AUW + Aaw)<p(-AUh - ah + p(AUw + Aaw)) 
• l• o• • 
+ 'f(AUW)cl>(-AUh - ah + ah + pAUw) 
• l• o• • • 
- 'f(AUW + Aaw)cl>(-AUh - ah + ah + p(AUw + Aaw))]xw' 
A ar + • 1• • • 
a-;;- = 'f(AU + Aa )cl>(-AUh - ah + p(AU + Aa )) aw w w 
w w 
• l* •o • • - 'f(.AUw + .Aaw)cp(-.AUh - ah + ah + p(.AUw + .Aaw)) • 
A ar + 1 o • • l • o• ----;J = -'f(.AUh + ah - ah)cl>(-AUw + p(AUh + ah - ah )) 
aah 
A ar + 
1 aah 
A ar + 
ap 
1 o • • • l• o• + 'f(AUh + ah - ah)cl>(-AUw - Aaw + p(AUh + ah - ah )), 
1 • • l• -f(AUh + ah)cf>(-AUw + p(AUh + ah )) 
1 • • • l• + 'fC.AUh + ah)cf>(-AUw - Aaw + p(AUh + ah )) 
1 o • • l• o• + 'f(.AUh + ah - ah)cii(-AUw + p(AUh + ah - ah )) 
1 o • • • l• o• - 'f(.AUh + ah - ah)cf>(-AUw - Aaw + p(AUh + ah - ah )) , 
f(-AU - a1 -AU p) - f(-AU - a1 -AU - Aa p) h h' w' h h' w w' 
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- f(-AU - a1 + aO -AU p) + f(-AU - a
1 + a0.-AU h h h • w' h h h w Aaw,p); 
B ar + • • • • • 
ayh 
= [-'f(AUh)cl>(-AUw + pAUh) + 'f(AUh)cl>(-AUw - Aaw + pAUh) 
B ar + 
ayw 
+ 'fC.AUh 
- 'f(AUh 
1 • • l• + ah)cf>(-AUW + p(AUh + ah )) 
1 • • • 1• + ah)cf>(-AUw - Aaw + p(AUh + ah ))]xn' 
• • • • • 
[-'f(.AUw)cl>(-AUh + pAUW) + 'f(AUW + Aaw)cl>(-AUh + p(.AUW + Aaw)) 
• l• • 
+ 'f(AUW)cp(-AUh - ah + pAUW) 
• l• • • 
- 'fCAUw + Aaw)Cl>(-AUh - ah + p(AUw + Aaw))]xw' 
ar8 + • • • 
a� = '!'(AUw + Aa )q>(-AUh + p(AU + Aa )) w w w w 
ar8 + 
• 1• • • - '!'(AU + Aa )Cl>(-AUh - ah + p(AU + Aa )), w w w w 
0 = o. ilah 
ilI8 + 1 • • 1• 
-1 = 'f(AUh + ah)cl>(-AUw + p(AUh + ah )) ilah 
1 • • • 1• - f(AUh + ah)<l>(-AUw - Aaw + p(AUh +ah )), 
B ill+ 1 ap- = f(-AUh,-AUw,p)-f(-AUh,-AUW - Aaw,p) - f(-AUh - ah,-AUW,p) 
arA 
ilyh 
arA 
ayw 
aIA 
ilAa w 
aIA 
+ f(-AU - a1 -AU - Aa p)· h h' W W' ' 
o • • • o• [-'!'(AUh - ah)cl>(-AUw - Aaw + p(AUh - ah )) 
o • • o• + f(AUh - ah)cl>(-AUw + p(AUh - ah )) 
1 o • • • 1• o• + '!'(AUh +ah - ah)<l>(-AUw - Aaw + p(AUh +ah - ah )) 
1 o • • 1• o• - 'f(AUh +ah - ah)cJ>(-AUw + p(AUh +ah - ah ))]xh' 
• o• • • [-'!'(AU + Aa )Cl>(-AUh + ah + p(AU + Aa )) w w w w 
• o• • + 'f(AUW)q>(-AUh + ah + pAUw) 
• 1• o• • • + 'f(AUW + Aaw)cJ>(-AUh - ah + ah + p(AUW + Aaw)) 
• 1• o• • - f(AUw)q>(-AUh - ah +ah + pAUw))]xw' 
• o• • • = -<l>IAIT + An l q> l -All. +a. + o(AU + Aa )) • ·--w --w· · -- n n · w w 
• 1• o• • • + '!'CAUw + Aaw)Cl>(-AUh - ah +ah + p(AUW + Aaw)), 
o • • • o• 
� O = 'f(AUh - ah)cJ>(-AUw - Aaw + p(AUh - ah )) v ah 
o • • o• - '!'(AUh - ah)cl>(-AUw + p(AUh - ah )) 
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1 - 'f(AUh + ah -
o • • • 1• o• ah)cJ>(-AUw - Aaw + p(AUh +ah - ah)) 
1 + 'f(AUh + ah -
o • • 1• o• ah)cJ>(-AUw + p(AUh +ah - ah )) , 
ilIA - 1 o • • • 1• o• -:--1 = '!'(AUh +ah - ah)cJ>(-AUw - Aaw + p(AUh +ah - ah )) 
v ah 
ilIA 
ilp 
aIB 
ilyh 
il18 
ilyw 
- '!'(AUh +a� - a�)cl>(-AU: + p(AU� +a�• - a�•)), 
0 0 f(-AUh + ah,-AUw - Aaw,p) - f(-AUh + ah,-AUw,p) 
1 0 1 0 - f(-AUh - ah+ ah,-AUw - Aaw,p) + f(-AUh - ah+ ah,-AUw,p); 
• • • • • 
[-'!'(AUh)Cl>(-AUw - Aaw + pAUh) + '!'(AUh)q>(-AUw + pAUh) 
o • • • o• + f(AUh - ah))Cl>(-AUw - Aaw + p(AUh - ah )) 
o • • o• 
- f(AUh - ah)<l>(-AUw + p(AUh - ah ))]xn' 
• • • • • [-f(AUW + Aaw)q>(-AUh + p(AUW + Aaw)) + f(AUw)cJ>(-AUh + pAUw) 
• o• • • 
+ f(AUW + Aaw)cJ>(-AUh +ah + p(AUw + Aaw)) 
• o• • - '!'(AUw)<l>(-AUh + ah + pAUW)]xw' 
B ill_ • • • 
il-,;:- = -'!'(AU + Aa )q>(-AUh + p(AU + Aa )) aw w w w w 
• o• • • 
+ f(AU + Aa )Cl>(-AUh +ah + p(AU + Aa )) w w w w 
ilr8 ;<i = -'!'(AU -
ah 
h 
o • • • o• ah)<l>(-AUw - Aaw + p(AUh - ah )) 
o • • o• + 'f(AUh - ah)<l>(-AUw + p(AUh - ah )), 
aIB 
--= = 0 1 • ilah 
il18 
il; = f(-AUh,-AUW - Aaw,p) - f(-AUh,-AUW,p) 
0 0 - f(-AUh + ah' - AUW - Aaw,p) + f(-AUh + ah,-AUW,p) 
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e. Elements of the matrices Dpt' Dht' and Dwt· 
33 
For simplicity, we drop the subscript t in the following expressions. 
1+ r s f(AUh,AUw + Aaw,p) 
2+ 1 r = -f(AUh + ah,AUw,p) 
3+ 1 r s f(AUh + ah,AUw + Aaw,p) 
4+ 1 0 r s f(Auh + 4l1 - ah,AUw,p) 
• h+ a • • • fCAUh)f)(-AUw - Aaw + pAUh) 
h+ 1 • • 1• b : -f(AUh + ah)f>(-AUw + p(AUh + ah )) 
h+ 1 • • • 1• c s f(AUh + ah)t>(-AUw - Aaw + p(AUh + ah )) 
h+ 1 o • • 1• o• d • f(AUh + ah - ah)t>(AUw - p(AUh + ah - ah ) ) 
w+ • • • a s f(AUw + Aaw)f>(AUh - p(AUW + Aaw)) 
w+ • 1• • b s f(AUw)<l>{-AUh - ah + pAUw) 
w+ • 1• • • c = fCAU + Aa l<l>(AUh + ah - p(AU + Aa )) w w w w 
w+ • 1• o• • d s -f(AUw)<l>(-AUh - ah + ah + pAUw) 
1-r = 
2 -r = 
f(AUh,AUW,p) 
1 0 f(AUh + 4l1 - ah,AUw + Aaw,p) 
3- 0 r s -f( AUh - ah,AUw + Aaw,p) 
4- 0 r s f(AUh - ah.AUw,p) 
h­a • 
• 
= -f(AUh)f)(-AUw + pAUh) 
bh
­
h-
1 0 • • • 1• s f(AUh + 4l1 - ah)f><AUw + Aaw - p(AUh + ah 
s -f(AUh - ag)il>(-AU: - Aa: + p(AU� - ag•;; c 
dh
-
aw-
o • • o• s f(AUh - ah)f>(-AUw + p(AUh - ah )) 
• • 
s f(AUW)<l>(-AUh + pAUW) 
- ag·)) 
w- • 1• o• • • b s f(AU + Aa l<l>CAUh + ah - ah - p(AU + Aa )) w w w w 
cw- = -�(AU + An ) <J>(AU• - aO* w w h h 
w- • o• • d = '(AUw)<J> (-AUh + ah + pAUw) 
f .  PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 
• • p(AU + Aa )) w w 
34 
Easily established by using either the areas defining the 
probabilities Pr(i, j), as found in part ( c) of this Appendix. or 
differentiating the probabilities found in Proposition 1 • 
Pr (0,0) 
1 ah -
0 ah no 
change 
Aa 7 w 
uh -
u 7 w 
Pr(0,0) 
1 ah no 
change 
0 ah no 
change 
Aa no w change 
uh 
-
u -w 
Case 1: 
Pr( l,0) 
no 
change 
no 
change 
-
+ 
-
1 0 Aa • (°w - a ) � O 
Prf0,1) Prfl,l) 
- + 
+ -
no + 
change 
- + 
+ 1 
Case 2 : Aa • (al - aO) w w w < 0 
Pr( 1.0) Pr(0,1) Pr( l,1) 
no - + 
change 
+ --
7 + -
+ - + 
? ? + 
Pr ( l, · ) 
+ 
-
7 
+ 
·1 
Pr ( l, o ) 
+ 
-
7 
+ 
? 
Pr( -.1) 
+ 
no 
change 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Pr(· ,1) 
no 
change 
+ 
+ 
+ 
g. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: 
Let zt 
' • 0 1 (Yht'Ywt'Xht'Xwt) and e = (p,Aaw,ah,ah,yh,yw). Define: 
B � [ T a1og f(Zt,9) • a1og f(Zt,9)] = E L a0 a0• -t:=l T t�l Bt 
From Section 4, we have, omitting the subscript t, that 
alogf(Z.9) = � aPr(l,l) + Yh(l - Yw) aPr(l.O) 
a0 Pr(l,ll a0 Pr(l,Ol a0 
+ 
(l - Yh)Yw aPr(O,l) + (l - Yh)(l - Yw) aPr(0,0) 
Pr(O,ll a0 Pr(O,Ol a0 
Then, a�o:f a��gf is given by 
[ yhyw aPr(l.1)12 + [Yh(l - Yw) aPr(l.0)1 2 
Pr< 1. ll ap Pr(l ,O) ap 
+ [<1 - YhlYw aPrCo.1>] 2 + [<l - Yh)(l - Yw> aPrCO.o>] 2 
Pr(O, 1) ap Pr( 0 ,0) ap 
where we have used the fact that Yh and Yw take on only the values 
zero or one. Since Yh and Yw are random variables where Yh = i, 
Yw = j with probability Pr(i,j), i,j e (0,1}, we have that 
Elrillogf illogf] _ __ l _ [aPr(l.1)]2 ap ap - Pr(l,1) ao 
+ __ l_ (aPr(l,0)) 2 + __ l_ (ilPrCO.ll]2 + 1 [aPr(O.Ol]2 Pr(l ,O) ilp Pr(0,1) ilp Pr(0,0) ilp 
Proceeding analogously, the remaining terms in B are given by: 
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E[illogf • illogf] _ t t --l __ �l ilPr(i.1) a0k aeh - =OJ=0Pr < i. j l aek a0h 
• 
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Notice that B can be decomposed into B = A'DA where A is of dimension 
4T by K, K = Kh +Kw + 4, that has as its t-th block At defined as: 
ilPrt(l,1) 
ilp 
ilPrt(l,0) 
ilp 
aPrt < o, ll 
ilp 
ilPrt(0,0) 
ilp 
aPrt(l,ll ilPrt(l,1) 
ilAaw 0 ilah 
ilPrt(l,O) aPrt(l,Ol 
ilAa 0 w ilah 
ilPrt(0,1) aPrt(O,ll 
ilAa aa0 w h 
ilPrt(0,0) aPrt(0,0) 
ilAa , 0 W u ah 
ilPrt(l,1) 
1 ilah 
ilPrt(l,0) 
1 ilah 
aPrt(O,ll 
aa1 h 
ilPrt(0,0) 
1 ilah 
ilPrt(l,1) 
' ilyh 
aPrt(l,Ol 
. 
ilyh 
ilPrt(0,1) 
' ayh 
ilPrt(0,0) 
' ilyh 
ilPrt(l,1) 
. 
ilyw 
ilPrt(l,0) 
' 
ayw 
ilPrt(0,1) 
ar
' 
w 
ilPrt(O,O) 
. 
ayw 
and D is a block diagonal matrix of order 4T, the t-th block given by 
Prt(l,1) 
.-1 0 0 0 
0 Prt( 1.0) 
0 0 
0 0 Prt(0,1) 0 
0 0 0 Prt(0,0) 
The model will be identified if and only if B is nonsingular (see, 
e.g., Rothenberg (1971)). Since D is of full rank and 4T > K, a 
necessary and sufficient condition is that A have full column rank. 
From part (d) of the Appendix, it is seen that the partial derivatives 
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of Prt ( i,j) with respect to the vec tor 9 depend on the sign of Aaw ; we 
must therefore check that matrix A is nonsingular for both cases . 
Case 1: Aaw 2 0 
Substituting into At the partial derivatives , using the 
i+ i+ i+ i+ - j+ -notation at ,bt ,ct ,dt ,i - h,w, and rt , j  - 1,2,3,4, found in the 
Appendix, we perform the following matrix algebra 
( i) add rows ( 2+3 +4) to row 1 
( ii) add row 2 to row 4 
( iii) add column 3 to column 4 
( iv) multiply columns 1, 2 and 6 by -1 
( v) Switch rows 3 and 4 
Rearranging columns and omitting row 1 since it is identically null, 
we have 
f ,. rt 2 + 3 +  At = ( rt + rt ) 4 +  rt 0 0 dh+ t 0 (bh+ + ch+) t t 0 h+ • at xh ( bh+ + h+) ' t ct xh h+ ' -dt xh w+ at w+ ct 0 w+ • at xw ( bw+ + w+) ' t ct xw w+ ' dt xw 
We now decompose the resulting matrix A into a partitioned matrix 
f I I l 
A = I DPXP I Dhxh I D;f.wj 
L I I 
where D
P
, Dh ' and Dw are each block diagonal matrices of order 3 T, the 
t-th blocks being Dpt • Dht' and Dwt respectively, as given in the 
text . 
Case 2 :  Aaw < o 
Subs titute into At the partial derivatives found in the 
� � � � - � -Appendix, again using at ,bt , ct , dt , 1  - h,w, and rt ,j - 1,2,3,4. 
Now perform the following matrix algebra on matrix A 
( i) add rows ( 1+2 +4) to row 3 
( ii) add row 4 to row 2 
( iii) add column 4 to column 3 
( iv) multiply column 6 by -1 
( v) switch rows 2 and 4 
Rearranging columns and omitting row 3 since it identically null , we 
have 
A
t = I 
1-rt 
2-rt 
3 - 4-( rt + rt ) 
0 0 
0 h-bt 
h-ct 0 
which can be written as X.  
h. PROOF OF COROLLARY 1 :  
h- 1 at xh 
h- 1 bt xh 
h- h- 1 - ( ct + dt )xh 
0 
w-bt 
w-ct 
w- 1 at xw 
bw-- 1 t xw 
( cw- + dw-)xl t t w 
When Aaw = 0 ,  it is seen from Section 4 of the text that 
h+ ht bt + ct = 0 .  Therefore matrix Dht is singular for all t which 
implies that matrix A no longer has full column rank. 
3 8  
Q . E . D .  
• 
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FOOTNOTES 
This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant 
SES-8410 5 93 . We are indebted to D .  Lien and D .  Rivers for helpful 
comments. and to Boy Toy for moral suppor t .  Remaining errors are 
ours. 
1.  Where an individual is indifferent, we arbitrarily assume that he 
or she will take action 1 .  
2 . Let us note that the husband is fully informed about the utility 
function of the wife ; that is, he not only knows the deterministic 
components in the util ities ( 3) - ( 4) given below, but also the 
random components. An interesting general ization, which will be 
pursued in future work, arises when the huband knows only the 
deterministic components, in which case one has a Stackelberg game 
under uncertainty ( see also Vuong (1982 ) ) . 
3 . Let us note that we allow the util ities Uh( l,Yw) and Uw ( l,Yh) to 
depend on Yw and Yh respectively. This contrasts with the 
formulation adopted in Bjorn and Vuong ( 1984, Equation ( 21) - ( 22 ) ) .  
4 .  I f  a < c ,  I ( a,b,c, d, p) is by convention the negative of the 
integral of the bivariate density over the range [a,c ] X [ d, b] .  A 
similar remark applies if b < d .  I f  both a < c and b < d, then 
I ( a,b,c,d,p ) is by convention the integral of the bivariate 
density over [a. cl  X [ b, d] . 
S .  We use a common set of explanatory variables ( see, e. g. , 
Ashenfelter and Heckman (197 4) ,  Gronau ( 197 3) ,  and Heckman 
( 1974) ) .  The same specification was also used in Bjorn and Vuong 
( 1984) . 
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